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CONSUMER PROTECTION
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES
The effectiveness of a consumer protection law usually can be
prejudged accurately by its enforcement mechanism. Truth in Len-
ding,1 for example, which is considered to be an effective consumer
protection enactment, is principally enforced by the private action.2
The -Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law,' and the FTC Act of 1914' on which it is modelled, rely
primarily on administrative enforcement.5 The Louisiana act relieves
the chief enforcement agent-the attorney general-of the burden
of proving irreparable injury or lack of adequate remedy at law
when he seeks injunctive relief under section 1407 of the act.
However, only the attorney general, acting in the interest of the
public at large, may seek injunctive relief under the Louisiana act;
the private litigant may not similarly proceed.' A 1976 federal court
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-41 (1977).
2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640 (1977). Regarding the effectiveness of the law, see note 53,
infra, and accompanying text.
3. LA. R.S. 51:1401-18 (Supp. 1972). The Louisiana act has been the subject of
three prior Symposium contributions: The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1978-1979 Term-Consumer Protection, 40 LA. L. REV. 619, 625-28 (1980) [herein-
after cited as 1978-1979 Term]; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1975-1976 Term-Consumer Protection, 37 LA. L. REV. 450, 457-58 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as 1975-1976 Term]; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1973-1974 Term-Consumer Protection, 35 LA. L. REV. 384, 398-99 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1973-1974 Term].
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (1979).
5. The Louisiana act does provide for private enforcement in section 1409, but an
aggrieved consumer faces a difficult problem of proof of an "ascertainable loss." Only if
the acts or practices of the defendant are found to have been knowingly used, after de-
fendant was put on notice by the director or the attorney general, may a court award
noncompensatory treble damages under section 1409. The difficulty of proving actual
damages is seen in Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. La. 1975),
and in Faris v. Model's Guild, 297 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); plaintiffs suc-
cessfully proved actual damages in Moore v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 364 So. 2d
630 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), and in General Inv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 303 So. 2d 624 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1974). Cf. Gour v. Daray Motor Co., Inc., 373 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1979) (return of purchase price as actual damages).
6. Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So. 2d 1067 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979);
Michaelson v. Motwani, 372 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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case, Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest,' held that in certain
narrow circumstances, a private litigant may bring an action for in-
junctive relief and compensatory damages under the FTC Act. The
concurring opinion of Judge Lemmon in the fourth circuit's Reed v.
Allison & Peronne' decision implicitly suggests the adoption in Loui-
siana of the Guernsey approach to private actions for injunctive
relief under the Louisiana act. A private action for injunctive relief
could thus be premised upon a showing of the inadequacy of section
1409 of the act as an effective deterrent against deceptive practices,
together with the inability of the attorney general of Louisiana, due
to inadequate resources and manpower, to fulfill the role created by
the act for that office, and hence to fulfill the purposes of the act.
Perhaps the sole difference between the scope of the Louisiana
act and that of the FTC act is that the former refers to "trade or
commerce" while the latter refers only to "commerce."9 The word
"trade" is encountered in many regulatory settings, and the word
has inspired much litigation over the years. A typical case involves
the possible inclusion of the so-called "learned professions" within
the meaning of "trade." The varying contexts within which the issue
has arisen prevent reliable generalizations, but it can be said that
the term "trade" is not typically thought to be synonymous with the
term "learned profession."'" The Louisiana act deals with the prob-
lem by including "distribution of any services" as one facet of the
definition of "trade."'" Yet, the clarity of the issue was not entirely
established, since the Civil Code jurisprudence has not always con-
sidered the practice of medicine and other professional services as
the distribution of services in the same sense as, for example, ter-
mite eradication. 2 The Reed decision holds that the advertising of
legal services involves a "trade or commerce" under the Louisiana
act's definition of those terms.
Section 1411 of the Louisiana act empowers the attorney general
7. 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976). But see Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp.,
485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
8. 376 So. 2d 1067 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
9. LA. R.S. 51:1405(A) (Supp. 1972); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). Of bourse, the Lou-
isiana act also expressly exempts certain acts and transactions, in section 1406.
10. See, e.g., Roy v. Mutual Rice Co. of La., 177 La. 883, 149 So. 508 (1933); Whit-
comb v. Reid, 31 Miss. 567 (1856); Babcock v. Laidlaw, 113 N.J. Eq. 318, 166 A. 632
(1933).
11. LA. R.S. 51:1402(10) (Supp. 1972).
12. Although the issue is not settled, Louisiana courts have generally regarded
the relationship between the consumer and the provider of professional services as one
from which only tort actions arise, reasoning that allegations of contractual obligations
are simply belated attempts to "breathe life into dead causes of action in tort." Phelps
v. Donaldson, 142 So. 2d 585, 587 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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to serve an "investigative demand" upon any person believed to
have information, documentary material, or physical evidence of
relevance to an alleged or suspected violation of the act, "[w]hen the
attorney general and director have evidence that a person has
engaged in or is engaged in" any method, act or practice prohibited
by the act. 3 The person served with an investigative demand can be
required to produce relevant material and physical evidence for ex-
amination. The attorney general's investigative demands upon a
dance studio operator were set aside by the Supreme Court of Loui-
siana as lacking in allegations of material fact, in Humphreys v.
State ex reL Guste,' the second recent decision of importance from
the court concerning the consumer protection law. 5 As a result of
the Humphreys decision, an investigative demand may be upheld
against a protective order only when it appears from specifically
pleaded facts that the attorney general actually has evidence of an
alleged violation of the act. Allegations in the form of general
statements indicating that the state has information that a violation
may have occurred are insufficient. The court has'equated the in-
vestigative demand with the commencement of a civil action; hence,
it must be "as specific and as factual as a petition in a civil suit,
alleging, not the evidence, but the 'material facts' on which it is
based""6 under article 891 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
The court seems clearly and understandably worried about the
potential of section 1411 as a staging area for a fishing expedition
by the attorney general; but an examination of section 1411 just as
clearly indicates that the statutory phrase-"ha[s] evidence that a
person has engaged in or is engaged in" a deceptive act or prac-
tice-cannot mean that the attorney general must have sufficient
evidence to warrant, for example, the filing of an injunction under
section 1407. In the first place, section 1411 itself qualifies the mean-
ing of the word "evidence" when it also requires that the attorney
general "believe it to be in the public interest that an investigation
should be made to ascertain whether a person in fact has engaged in
or is engaging in any [deceptive] act or practice," and when the sec-
tion speaks of "information, documentary material or physical
13. LA. R.S. 51:1411 (Supp. 1972).
14. 377 So. 2d 88 (La. 1979).
15. The decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in State v. General Motors
Corp., 370 So. 2d 477 (La. 1979), concerning the power of the attorney general to seek
restitution on behalf of a class of consumers, was the first important decision from the
court. See Note, The Class Action as a Consumer Protection Device: State v. General
Motors Corp., 40 LA. L. REV. 497 (1980). The court had previously addressed the ex-
emption of public utilities in State v. Council of City of New Orleans, 309 So. 2d 290
(La. 1975).
16. 377 So. 2d at 92.
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evidence relevant to the alleged or suspected violation." Second, the
genesis of the investigation will usually be a complaint or series of
complaints from the alleged violator's customers and competitors.
To require the attorney general to set forth at the investigative
stage "material facts," in a strict sense, would certainly hamper his
enforcement abilities. That would be unfortunate, given that the
clear tenor of section 1411 recognizes that the attorney general may
be in a position only to allege, in effect, that he suspects a violation
of the act may have occurred-the very procedure so obviously
disliked by the supreme court.
Section 1412 of the act perhaps provides the key. Since the
court pointed out that the investigative demand is not a subpoena, 7
the decision presumably does not affect the power of the attorney
general to issue an "investigative subpoena" for deposition
testimony pursuant to section 1412. Section 1412, however, similarly
requires that the attorney general "have evidence" of a violation of
the act before issuing the investigative subpoena. The stated pur-
pose of the subpoena is to reveal, identify, or explain material or
evidence sought by an investigative demand. Section 1412 (again,
presumably) is intended to aid the attorney general in meeting the
"have evidence" requirement of section 1411.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Truth in Lending
Consumer credit transactions typically involve precomputed
finance charges, monthly installment payments, and an acceleration
clause permitting the creditor to demand early payment of future in-
stallments. 8 There are two principal forms of acceleration clauses.
The typical form permits acceleration upon the occurrence of some
default specifically set out in the agreement; 9 the other form per-
mits the creditor to accelerate at will when he deems himself in-
secure. Both forms are permitted in Louisiana;20 but good faith must
attend the creditor's resort to his acceleration right,2 and the deb-
tor must receive a rebate, or remission, of unearned precomputed in-
17. Id.
18. An acceleration clause is simply a stipulation "by which the time for payment
of the debt is hastened or advanced because of breach of some condition" of the con-
tract by the debtor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 26 (4th ed. 1951).
19. See Budget Plan of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Talbert, 276 So. 2d 297 (La. 1973).
20. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1764; LA. R.S. 10:1-208 (Supp. 1974); Budget Plan of Baton
Rouge, Inc. v. Talbert, 276 So. 2d 297 (La. 1973).
21. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1901; LA. R.S. 10:1-103, 1-203 & 1-208 (Supp. 1974).
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terest, 2 computed by application of the "sum of the digits" method. 23
The Truth in Lending2' act contains no disclosure requirements
specifically encompassing the acceleration clause, and throughout
the decade of the 1970's courts did not agree as to the role the ac-
celeration clause was intended to play in the federal scheme of
disclosure of the true cost of credit. By the end of the decade the
issue was completely entangled in a web of confusion, 2 despite the
existence of a Federal Reserve Board Staff Interpretation directly
on point.2' The United States Supreme Court has now endorsed the
view of the Federal Reserve Board. The decision in Ford Motor
Credit Company v. Milhollin 7 establishes the following rules for
disclosure where the creditor has the right to accelerate: 1) the act
of accelerating the indebtedness imposes, by itself, no monetary
penalty or assessable charge on the debtor and consequently cannot
be equated with a "default, delinquency, or similar charg[e]" under
sections 1638(a)(9) or 1639(a)(7) of the act, or section 226.8(b)(4) of
Regulation Z;2 ' 2) accelerated payment is, perhaps, an "involuntary"
22. LA. R.S. 9:3529 (Supp. 1972); Budget Plan of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Talbert, 276
So. 2d 297 (La. 1973).
23. LA. R.S. 9:3528, 3529 (Supp. 1972 & 1974). See generally Louisiana's New Con-
sumer Protection Legislation, 34 LA. L. REV. 597, 622-23 n.91 (1974).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-41 (1976). The Truth in Lending act has been the subject of
three prior Symposium contributions: The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1972-1973 Term-Consumer Protection, 34 LA. L. REV. 326, 326-31 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 1972-1973 Term]; 1973-1974 Term, supra note 3, at 386-87, 390-92;
1975-1976 Term, supra note 3, at 450-56.
25. Three principal views had evolved by the end of 1979. Some courts had held
that an acceleration was not a "default charge" under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638(a)(9) and
1639(a)(7) [12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1980)], and need not be disclosed at all. Other courts
took the contrary view and required disclosure. Still other courts held that accelera-
tion could result in a "charge" whenever state law or the terms of the contract permit-
ted retention of unearned interest upon acceleration. The jurisprudential lineup is
presented in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 100 S. Ct. 790 (1980).
26. Official Staff Interpt. No. FC-0054, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1980), 42 Fed. Reg. 17865
(April 4, 1977). Staff interpretations are issued by the FRB staff pursuant to 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.1(d). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (1976). The provisions of Regulation Z itself are
entitled to great deference by virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in Mourning v.
Family Pub. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973). Informal staff opinion letters are held to
be persuasive, but not binding on the courts. See, e.g., Franklin v. First Money, Inc.,
427 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. La. 1976); Pedro v. Pacific Plan of Cal., 393 F. Supp. 315 (N.D.
Cal. 1975); Stefanski v. Mainway Budget Plan, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Fla. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1972). Board interpretations of Regula-
tion Z have also been held entitled to great deference by courts. Gantt v. Com-
monwealth Loan Co., 416 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Mo. 1976), affd, 573 F.2d 520 (8th Cir.
1978).
27. 100 S. Ct. 790 (1980).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638(aX9), 1639(a)(7) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1980). The court
viewed delinquency charges as the compensation a creditor receives on a pre-computed
1981]
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prepayment of the obligation, and as such, the creditor is required
by Regulation Z, § 226.8(b)(7)29 to identify the method that he will
employ to compute any unearned portion of the finance charge;" but
so long as his acceleration-rebate method is the same (e.g., the sum
of the digits) as his rebate policy for voluntary prepayment, no
separate disclosure of the creditor's acceleration-rebate policy is re-
quired; 3) accelerated payment can result in a default charge to be
disclosed under Regulation Z, § 226.8(b)(4),31 if the creditor retains
unearned finance charges beyond that he would retain by rebating
in accordance with the rebate policy he was required to disclose pur-
suant to section 226.8(b)(7).2
The Milhollin decision clarifies more than one confused
disclosure area; the deference it lends to official interpretations of
the Federal Reserve Board staff will serve to clarify other areas of
the law. One such area involves those fees collected by a seller and
paid to the state, such as license, title transfer, and registration
fees, which are among the fees specified in Regulation Z, § 226.4(b)3
that are, if separately itemized and disclosed, not required to be in-
contract for the debtor's delay in making payments, holding, however, that accelera-
tion, as a device by which the creditor avoids further delay in payment of the outstand-
ing debt, results in no "charges payable in the event of late payments" under 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1638(a)(9) and 1639(a)(7).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) (1980).
30. If state law does not require acceleration or prepayment rebates (and the
creditor does not magnanimously make such rebates), or if the creditor does not intend
to make rebates, state law notwithstanding, Regulation Z also requires the "no rebate"
policy to be disclosed. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) (1980).
31. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1980).
32. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) (1980). The court does not directly treat this aspect of
Staff Interpretation No. F.C.-0054, but the opinion clearly sanctifies the entire Inter-
pretation. A bit of murkiness still attends the situation where the creditor is required
by state law to rebate unearned finance charges, but discloses to the consumer that no
rebate will be made. If the creditor subsequently does what he disclosed he would
do-make no rebate-the literal language of Interpretation F.C.-0054 indicates no
violation of the requirements of section 226.8(b)(4), because the creditor has not retained
any amount "beyond those which would have been rebated under the disclosed rebate
provisions." Yet the Milhollin opinion clearly suggests a contrary conclusion in its
discussion of the right of acceleration per se: "In itself, acceleration entails no
monetary penalty, although a creditor may independently impose such a penalty, for
example, by failing to rebate unearned finance charges." 100 S. Ct. at 795 (emphasis
added). However, the only penalty-disclosure provision of Regulation Z is section
226.8(b)(6), and the provision uses the term "penalty charge." So, presumably there is
no need to disclose a penalty that results in no assessable charge. This is the view of
the FRB, expressed in the context of the difference in yields between the "sum of the
digits" method and the "actuarial" method: That difference does not constitute a pen-
alty charge under section 226.8(b)(6) because there is no assessed charge. 12 C.F.R. §
226.818(b) (1980).
33. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b) (1980).
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eluded in the finance charge." A North Carolina federal court deci-
sion has recently adopted the view of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals that the section 226.4(b) items may be disclosed as itemized
components of the finance charge or separately disclosed as itemized
"other charges" included in the amount financed but not part of the
finance charges," but that they may not be disclosed as part of the
cash price, with or without itemization." The court pointed out that
the definition of "cash price" in Regulation Z states that the cash
price shall not include "any . . .charges of the types described in §
226.4."" 7 Because Regulation Z also requires the creditor to clearly
and meaningfully disclose the cash price, 8 inclusion of the section
226.4(b) items in the cash price would arguably violate the act. 9 The
FRB staff does not agree, however. The staff believes that the pur-
pose of the reference in the definition of cash price"° to the section
226.4 items was intended to prevent creditors from hiding finance
charges in their cash price, and therefore the section 226.4(b) items
must be excluded from the cash price disclosure only if they con-
stitute "finance charges." Thus, the FRB staff would permit inclu-
sion of such items in the cash price whenever the creditor is not re-
quired to include those items in the finance charge.
41
Truth-in-Lending Simplification
In view of the dislosure problems discussed above, only the
uninitiated would exclaim the complexity of truth in lending. Con-
gress intended a "meaningful" disclosure of credit terms to enable
the relatively unsophisticated average consumer of credit to employ
comparison shopping for his credit." To that end some nine
disclosure-requirement sections were enacted,"3 which, in fairness to
34. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(cX8) & (dX3) (1980).
35. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(c)(4) (1980).
36. Downey v. Whaley-Lamb Ford Sales, Inc., 607 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1979); Dalton
v. Bob Neill Pontiac, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 789 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
37. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(n) (1980).
38. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) & 8(c)(1) (1980); 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976).
39. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631(a), 1640(a) (1976).
40. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(n) (1980).
41. Official FRB Staff Interpt. No. FC-0169, 45 Fed. Reg. 3879, 3880 (January 12,
1980). See Bright v. Ball Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 616 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1980) (following
FRB Official Staff Interpt. No. FC-0101 of July 19, 1977, concerning informal
"workout" arrangements with delinquent customers).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
43. The sections of Title 15 of the United States Code are: 1605 ("Determination
of finance charge"); 1606 ("Determination of annual percentage rate"); 1631 ("Disclosure
requirements"); 1632 ("Form of disclosure; additional information"); 1635 ("Right of
rescission as to certain transactions"); 1636 ("Periodic statements; contents"); 1637
("Open end consumer credit plans"); 1638 ("Sales not under open end credit plans");
1639 ("Consumer loans not under open end credit plans").
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Congress, cannot be characterized as unduly complex, in view of the
wide range of business activities and contractual terms covered by
the law. But two provisions of the law, viewed as necessary to
assure compliance, virtually guaranteed that the act would become
complex and would be subjected to the constant pressure of
criticism. First, section 1640 of the act" unswervingly demands near
perfection in compliance by large institutional creditors and small
neighborhood creditors alike. Second, section 1604" delegates to the
Federal Reserve Board the power to prescribe regulations to carry
out the purpose of the act, and those regulations "may contain such
classifications, differentiations, or other provisions . . . as in the
judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the
[act's] purposes . . . , to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or
to facilitate compliance therewith." Thus, where Congress provided
eight specific disclosures for other than open-end loans, ' the FRB in
Regulation Z requires those eight, plus seven more, for a total of fif-
teen specific disclosures; 7 where Congress required the sale creditor
to make ten specific disclosures,'8 Regulation Z requires twenty;'9
where Congress decreed that all disclosures be clear and con-
spicuous," Regulation Z adds that they also be "in meaningful se-
quence" and in prescribed terminology.' Each additional disclosure
requirement both promotes the purposes of the act and adds com-
plexity that increases the creditor's exposure to the civil penalties
of section 1640. The remedial nature of the act brought forth a
liberal construction in the courts, 2 adding to the problem.
Despite its complexity, there is solid evidence that the truth in
lending law has begun to fulfill its purposes. In the FRB's Annual
Report to Congress on Truth in Lending for the year 1977, the
Board noted that there have been significant increases in consumer
awareness of credit costs between 1969 and 1977."3 Yet, there also is
evidence that disclosure statements that comply with the act and
Regulation Z require too many disclosures which, whether or not in-
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1976).
47. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.8(b), (d) (1980).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1976).
49. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.8(b), (c) (1980).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1976).
51. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1980).
52. See, e.g., Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974); N.C. Freed Co.,
Inc. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973);
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
53. The following tables summarize those appended to the Annual Report.
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herently confusing, tend to overwhelm and confuse the consumer. 4
Such information overkill was doubtless the catalyst for the Truth-
in-Lending Simplification and Reform Act55 signed into law on
March 31, 1980, to be effective on April 1, 1982.
"Simplification" is clearly a better label for the act than "revi-
sion," and in no manner may the word "renovation" be used to
describe the act; in that sense the simplication act will be
disappointing to some. The act is, however, a step in the right direc-
tion. Agricultural credit extensions are removed from the scope of
truth in lending, and sellers will no longer be required to itemize, as
part of the finance charge, those fees such as sales taxes, license
fees, and registration fees paid by cash as well as credit customers.
More importantly, the disclosures required of sellers and lenders
Table 1: All Types of Installment Credit
Level of APR Awareness
(percent)
Types of credit: 1969 1977
Closed-end 14.5 54.6
Retail revolving 35.2 64.7
Bank credit cards 26.6 71.0
Table 2: Closed-end Credit Only
Level of APR Awareness
(percent)
Categories: 1969 1977
New autos 17.5 70.5
Used autos 7.2 37.8
Home improvement 15.3 67.2
Personal loans 20.2 54.8
Appliances & furniture 11.7 44.7
Consolidated 14.5 54.6
Table 3: Sources of Closed-end Credit
Level of APR Awareness
(percent)
Source: 1969 1977
Banks 12.8 52.1
Credit Unions 27.8 66.1
Finance Companies 16.7 57.6
Retailers 9.4 42.1
The Report also indicates that from 1969 to 1977 there have occurred dramatic in-
creases in the awareness of the annual percentage rate at all levels of education, age,
income, and race.
54. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING, FOR THE YEAR 1978 (1979).
55. The act is Title VI of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-221, __ Stat. _.
1981)
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will be combined in one listing, to be disclosed only as applicable to
the transaction in question. The most important aspect of the
simplification act is its requirement that the FRB both promulgate
model disclosure forms that comply with the law and provide a safe
harbor for creditors using them, and prepare a new revision of
Regulation Z by April 1, 1981. The real simplification of truth in len-
ding will be accomplished through the proposed revision of Regula-
tion Z, which the FRB has already published for public comment.56
Among the changes which the FRB proposes, beyond those of the
simplification act itself, are: 1) incorporation into Regulation Z of the
substance of many Board and FRB staff interpretations, and the
clarification of various problem areas raised by court decisions; 2)
encouragement of early disclosure through the use of streamlined
closed-end credit disclosures that reflect representative transac-
tions; 3) elimination of twelve of the twenty-four current closed-end
disclosures for certain transactions; 4) elimination of many of the
current "format" requirements for open-end credit; and 5) a conform-
ing of the open-end credit disclosures to the requirements of the
Electronic Fund Transfer provisions," wherever necessary and
possible.
Equal Credit Opportunity
To be a successful competitor in the consumer credit market,
creditors must discriminate; that is, they must strive to
distinguish-and deny credit to-those consumers who are not
creditworthy because they are unable or unwilling to repay the
credit extended. To fail to do so increases the creditor's costs,
thereby indirectly penalizing creditworthy consumers who must ac-
cept and repay credit at higher rates of interest. In short, society
desires, and creditor self-interest demands, that creditors do dis-
criminate by simply using sound business judgment. Of course, there
also is another meaning of discrimination-to distinguish or pre-
judge on a class or categorical basis in disregard of individual merit.
This latter form of discrimination is not necessarily repugnant.
Automobile insurers usually employ it when they impose higher in-
surance rates for families having driving-age sons than for families
having driving-age daughters. The practice is defensible on the basis
that, as a class, young male drivers have more accidents than young
female drivers, and that it is not possible to accurately predict, on
an individual basis, which youthful drivers will have accidents. In-
surers could not, on the other hand, discriminate on the basis of eye,
56. 45 Fed. Reg. 29702-62 (1980).
57. 15 U.S.C.A §§ 1693-93r (1978).
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hair, or skin color. It is much the same story with creditors. Because
credit has become so important to the consumer, the discrimination
society demands of creditors must be rationally related to his
business risks.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act58 represents a Congressional
attempt to force creditors to discriminate solely on the basis of two
factors: the ability to repay and willingness to repay. The ability of
an applicant to repay is demonstrated primarily by a consideration
of such factors as the applicant's income (and other resources), his
other indebtedness, his employment stability, and his preparedness
for severe drains on his resources, such as medical expenses. The
willingness of the applicant to repay is demonstrated primarily by
his record of prior repayment to other creditors. By prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex, marital status, age, or source of income, 9 Congress in effect
leaves only ability and willingness to repay as factors for considera-
tion by creditors. Because marital status and age can, in some cir-
cumstances, also be related to one's ability to repay, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act and its implementing regulations (Regula-
tion B) permit limited creditor inquiries in regard thereto."
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act cannot fairly be depicted as a
response by Congress to blatant and widespread discrimination in
credit-granting on the basis of the prohibited categories. It stretches
credulity to assume that the officers and directors of a credit seller
or financial institution would place themselves squarely in the cross-
hairs of a shareholder suit6 by intentionally turning away profitable
credit extensions solely because of the applicant's race, sex, marital
status, or any other prohibited bases. That creditors may, however,
have employed various "shortcuts" that have the effect of discrim-
ination on one or more of the prohibited bases is demonstrated in re-
cent decisions. In Cherry v. Amoco Oil Company,2 for instance,
Amoco cited, as one of the factors for denial of credit, 3 its negative
credit experience in the applicant's immediate geographical area.
The area in question happened to be one heavily populated by
blacks and readily identifiable by postal zip codes. Amoco could, no
doubt, demonstrate that in its experience a disproportionate number
58. 15 US.C. §§ 1691-91f (1976). See 1978-1979 Term, supra note 3, at 630-34.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (1976).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (1980).
61. See LA. R.S. 12:91 (Supp. 1968).
62. 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980), earlier opinion, 481 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ga.
1979).
63. Creditors are required by 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d) to provide a statement of
specific reasons for denial of credit.
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of defaults in repayment occurred in that area;"4 but the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act arguably was violated by Amoco's use of the
neighborhood factor. 5 Of interest in Cherry is the fact that the
plaintiff was a white resident of a predominantly black area; she
was held to have standing under the act to pursue her claim of
racial discrimination.
The creditor's shortcut in Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Ser-
vice Company Associates, Inc. 7 was its refusal to aggregate the in-
comes of unmarried joint applicants, both of whom were willing to
obligate themselves to repay. Because state law made no distinction
meaningful to creditors between married and unmarried couples, a
claim of discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was
stated, based on the creditor's admitted practice of aggregating the
incomes of similarly situated, but married, joint applicants. Whether
such a literal reading of 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) was intended by Con-
gress remains to be tested, perhaps by a case involving unmarried
homosexual joint applicants or polygamous applicants. 8
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company also has a shortcut
regarding applications for utilities service: the company will not sup-
ply service 9 to any applicant then indebted to it, or who, at the time
of the application, is a member of the household of a former
customer who is indebted to it, unless such indebtedness be paid.
How should such a practice be applied to the application of a woman
64. See Hersbergen, The Improvident Extension of Credit as an Unconscionable
Contract, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 225, 233-41 (1974).
65. The Northern District of Georgia held in the Cherry case that the plaintiffs
allegation of racial discrimination stated a claim upon which relief may be granted
under the act, 481 F. Supp. at 730, but ultimately found in favor of Amoco. 490 F.
Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
66. The issue was before the court on Amoco's motion to dismiss for lack of stand-
ing. The opinion stresses the language of 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1), that it is "unlawful for
any creditor to discriminate against any applicant ... on the basis of race .... " 481 F.
Supp. at 729 (emphasis added). The court also denied Amoco's motion for summary
judgment, finding in the case disputed material facts, ultimately resolved against the
plaintiff. 490 F. Supp. at 1026.
67. 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
68. Applying a more favorable income aggregation rule to married couples than to
unmarried couples is not, perhaps, the problem Congress sought to cure. Rather,
discrimination against unmarried women applicants (e.g., applying less favorable stan-
dards to them than to similarly situated unmarried men) and married women applying
for credit in their own names would seem to be the real problem. The facts of the
Markham case do fall within the literal language of section 1691(a)(1), however.
69. South Carolina Electric did extend credit by permitting deferred payment.
Under Regulation B, there is no requirement that there be a finance charge or a "more
than four installments" agreement. Compare 12 C.FR. § 202.2(j) & (1) (1980) with 12
C.F.R. § 226.2(q) & (s) (1980).
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whose husband (in whose name the former account stood) no longer
resided with her? The company's refusal to open a new account in
her name unless the indebtedness in the husband's name was first
paid was, in Haynsworth v. South Carolina Electric & Gas
Company,"0 held not violative of the act because, under state law,
there was an implied obligation on her part to pay for past services
consumed even though the account was not in her name. The case il-
lustrates not only the important role state law may play in an equal
credit opportunity case, but also the nature of unlawful discrimina-
tion. So long as South Carolina Electric applied the past in-
debtedness policy evenly, that is, refused new accounts without
regard to the sex, marital status, age, etc., of the applicant, the
discrimination was permissible. Thus, plaintiff's husband should
likewise be denied a new account."
Computerized processing of applications for, and issuance of,
credit cards apparently enhances the likelihood of shortcuts in the
granting of credit. In Harbaugh v. Continental Illinois National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago," for example, a credit card applica-
tion by "Mrs. John P. Harbaugh" yielded issued cards in the name
of "John P. Harbaugh," the applicant's husband. Had the applicant
applied for the card in the name of "Helen D. Harbaugh," the issuer
would risk violation of the act if it refused to judge the applicant on
her own ability and willingness to repay; in fact, only in limited cir-
cumstances would the issuer be permitted to inquire as to her
marital status, 3 that status being, in general, unrelated to ability
and willingness to repay. But was the refusal of the bank to issue a
card in the name of "Mrs. John P. Harbaugh" an example of
discrimination" on the prohibited basis of sex? The seventh circuit
says that it is not. In fact, since the creditor may not inquire as to
the applicant's marital status, the bank could not have required the
use of any such "courtesy titles" as "Mr.," "Mrs.," or "Ms." Nothing
in the act requires a creditor to employ a voluntarily supplied
courtesy title. Mrs. Harbaugh alternatively asserted that if it was
the practice of the bank to use no courtesy titles, it at least should
have realized that an application by a "Mrs. John P. Harbaugh" was
70. 488 F. Supp. 565 (D. S.C. 1979).
71. As fate so often provides, plaintiff's husband was in fact permitted to open a
new account prior to payment of the existing indebtedness, apparently through in-
advertence. Id. at 566.
72. 615 F. 2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1980).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(1) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (1980).
74. Plaintiff reapplied for a credit card in the name of "Helen D. Harbaugh," but
once again the reply of the bank's computer was in the form of cards issued in the
name of plaintiff's husband.
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an application by her for an account in her own name, and been
under a duty to either advise her of the bank's "no courtesy name"
practice or to ascertain her given name. The court refused to find
such a duty."5 An implicit part of the decision in the Harbaugh case
is that the cards issued in the name of "John P. Harbaugh," but ap-
plied for by "Mrs. John P. Harbaugh," were in fact Mrs. Harbaugh's
cards (denuded of courtesy titles), not her husband's cards. The deci-
sion drew a credible dissent.
The Cherry, Markham, Haynsworth, and Harbaugh cases involve
no earthshaking points of law, but those cases do demonstrate the
nature and scope of the ECOA. The Markham case aside, few
creditors are likely to utilize-and less likely to admit that they
utilize-factors directly relating to any of the prohibited categories.
Amoco Oil Company may well discriminate on the basis of residen-
tial address; not likely will Amoco state, or even concede, that a
given applicant was turned down because he was black, or Hispanic.
There simply will not typically exist such a dual standard. The dif-
ficulty for the aggrieved applicant, then, is to make a prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination. The Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation B, § 202.6(a), contains a footnote stating that "[tihe
legislative history of the Act indicates that the Congress intended
an 'effects test' concept .. . to be applicable to a creditor's deter-
mination of creditworthiness,""6 citing the employment discrimina-
tion cases of Griggs v. Duke Power Company" and Albermarle
Paper Company v. Moody."8 The Cherry case provides an example of
the operation of the "effects" test. Amoco utilized a computerized
scoring system to make its creditworthiness determination, assign-
ing to each of thirty-eight factors a weight, or rating, of 1 to 5. A
high level of income might receive a rating of 5, a more modest in-
come only a 2 or 3; certain occupations might receive higher ratings
than others, and length of time on the job would be similarly rated.
Amoco's computer would then aggregate all thirty-eight ratings or
scores and match the total against Amoco's predetermined minimum
acceptable total. Those applicants whose total scores fell short of
the minimum would automatically be denied credit. One of Amoco's
thirty-eight factors is residence, and under the Amoco scoring
system, most areas bearing a 303 zip code prefix were assigned a
75. Plaintiff admitted receiving federally required notices (from other creditors)
advising her of her right to have credit histories reported in her own name. 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.10 (1980). The court believes that a creditor could not require an applicant to sup-
ply her given name, without risk of violation of the act. 615 F.2d at 1173-75.
76. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) (1980).
77. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
78. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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low rating. Plaintiff's zip code area, 30310, received a rating of 1;
had she resided in a zip code area assigned a weight of 3, 4, or 5, her
aggregate score would have warranted the issuance to her of an
Amoco credit card. In effect, an applicant residing in an unfavorably
rated neighborhood must show more income, greater job stability,
etc., to qualify under the scoring system than applicants residing in
more favorably rated areas. Although residence has no particular
relationship to willingness and ability to repay, it is not a prohibited
basis of discrimination. Futhermore, no explicit dual standard ex-
isted-an applicant living within one of the unfavorably rated areas
would receive the same treatment from Amoco's computer whatever
be his age, sex, marital status, race, etc. An examination of the ap-
plicant's neighborhood might, however, reveal that it is populated
predominantly by poor, black, female heads of households. Under
the "effects" test, it might be concluded that the creditor's credit-
worthiness determination policy has the effect-whether or not in-
tended-of denying credit to a disproportionate number of black
female heads of households or, put in other words, constitutes prima
facie evidence of discrimination on the basis of marital status, race,
and sex."9 Since such a pattern of discrimination could be violative of
the act, the burden then would be on the creditor to demonstrate
the validity of his requirements in terms of willingness and ability
to repay.
The Cherry case, the first to apply the "effects" test in the
ECOA setting, ultimately ruled that the plaintiff had failed to make
out a prima facie case of discrimination, her proof showing only that
Amoco's scoring system as a whole tended to reject a dispropor-
tionate number of applicants residing in black areas, not that the zip
code criterion itself did so. The major hurdle confronting plaintiff
was her inability to establish either an actual pool of Amoco ap-
plicants or one group acceptable as reasonably possessing that pool's
characteristics. The court does concede that if, due to housing pat-
terns, the zip code/race correlation is shown to be high, the zip code
criterion could be considered as a mere substitute for a racial
criterion;" but it was shown that not all low-rated zip code areas
were predominantly black. In fact, the aggregated population of all
the low-rated areas was only 40% black. Thus, so long as the zip
code criterion tended to equally penalize otherwise qualified whites
and blacks residing in those areas, the criterion might be perform-
ing a disservice to Amoco shareholders, but would not be unlawfully
discriminatory.
79. See Baer, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the "Effects Test," 95 BANK-
ING L.J. 241 (1978).
80. 490 F. Supp. at 1031.
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The ECOA's civil liability provisions8 resemble those of the
Truth in Lending Act: a failure to comply with any requirement of
the act calls for an award of actual damages, sought individually or
as a member of a class, but good faith conformity to an FRB rule,
regulation, or interpretation thereof shields the creditor from liabili-
ty. Unlike the Truth in Lending Act, there is no ECOA general pro-
vision forgiving creditors for unintentional violations resulting from
bona fide errors.2 However, Regulation B does provide for a similar
"inadvertent error" defense for failures to comply with the re-
quirements pertaining to notice of, and statement of reasons for,
adverse action. 3 Regulation B defines "inadvertent error" as a
mechanical, electronic, or clerical error that was not intentional and
occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted
to avoid such an error.84 In Desselles v. J.C. Penney Company,85 the
creditor had employed two persons to handle notification re-
quirements with respect to adverse action taken by it on credit ap-
plications. The two employees fell behind in sending out the notifica-
tions, at the rate of about ten per day. Predictably, the company
was unable to meet the notice requirements when it denied
plaintiff's application. 8 On the creditor's inadvertent-error-premised
motion for summary judgment, the federal district court for the
eastern district of Louisiana determined the defense to be inap-
plicable; the error causing the noncompliance was not a "clerical er-
ror," but one of judgment in not realizing the need to reduce the
backlog of notifications. Of course, had the court characterized the
backlog problem as a "clerical error," Penney would still have been
required to show that at the time of the error, procedures reason-
ably adapted to avoid this very problem were being maintained.
Should a case like Desselles go to trial, a key issue will involve
proof of notification under Regulation B, § 202.9.88 A writing ad-
dressed to the applicant and delivered, or mailed to the applicant's
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (1976).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1976).
83. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(e) (1980).
84. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(s) (1980).
85. No. 78-1495 (E.D. La. 1979).
86. Regulation B requires a "notification of action taken" within 30 days of
adverse action. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(1) (1980). Penney apparently complied with that re-
quirement, but Regulation B also requires either a "statement of reasons" for the ac-
tion taken, within the "notification of action taken," or a disclosure therein that the ap-
plicant is entitled to the statement within thirty days after receipt by the creditor of
the applicant's request therefor. Plaintiff made such a request by a letter to Penney
dated August 11, 1977. Penney claimed compliance by its letter of October 14, 1977,
but plaintiff denied receipt thereof.
87. See Mirabal v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 537 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1976).
88. See note 86, supra.
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last known address, constitutes the giving of notice." Actual receipt
by the applicant is not required. Presumably, a last known address
refers to the address listed on the application, rather than to ad-
dresses listed in an external source such as a telephone directory.
Both the Truth in Lending Act and the ECOA provide for the
recovery of punitive, as well as actual, damages. The Truth in Lend-
ing Act sets a ceiling of $1,000 on punitive damages and computes
such damages by simply doubling the finance charge; 0 the ECOA
has a $10,000 ceiling on punitive damages." Both acts provide for
class action status." The Truth in Lending Act sets out a list of fac-
tors to be considered by the court in making a class action award;9"
the ECOA does likewise, but the factors there listed ostensibly ap-
ply equally to the determination of punitive damages in both individ-
ual and class actions.' The federal court for the eastern district of
Wisconsin has recently ruled otherwise. In Vander Missen v.
Kellogg-Citizens National Bank9" the plaintiff believed that she had
been denied credit in her own name, on the basis of her husband's
unfavorable credit rating-a violation of the ECOA. In her individ-
ual action against the bank for punitive damages, she sought
discovery by interrogatories as to the steps taken by the bank since
the time of the alleged violation to assure that future applicants
would not be discriminated against, and discovery by means of a
newspaper advertisement for witnesses of the names of women who
might have been subjected to similar treatment by the bank in the
previous five years. The bank predictably blanched at such maneu-
vers; but plaintiff argued that such discovery was permitted by the
list of factors to be considered by the court in awarding punitive
damages, particularly "the frequency and persistence of failures of
compliance by the creditor," "the number of persons adversely af-
fected," and "the extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance
was intentional."" Had plaintiff pursued the case as representative
for a class, she seemingly would be entitled to her proposed news-
89. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(f) (1980).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) (1976). Section 1640 does not use the label "punitive"
when providing a minimum recovery of $100 and a maximum recovery of $1,000.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1976).
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a)(2)(B), 1691e(b) (1976).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1976). The factors are: 1) the amount of any actual
damages awarded under section 1691e(a); 2) the frequency and persistence of failures
of compliance by the creditor; 3) the resources of the creditor; 4) the number of per-
sons adversely affected; 5) the extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance was
intentional; and 6) any other relevant factors.
95. 481 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
96. See note 94, supra.
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paper advertisement, and perhaps even answers to her interroga-
tories-although normally Federal Rule of Evidence 407 would pre-
vent discovery of subsequently taken measures which, if previously
adopted, would have made the violation less likely to occur. The
court, however, blocked both of plaintiff's discovery efforts, ruling
that the list of factors in section 1691e(b) was intended by Congress
as a protective shield for class action defendants, rather than as an
aid to an individual plaintiff's efforts to recover punitive damages.
Thus, the court refused, as irrelevant, any consideration of discrim-
ination against other women applicants, on the premise that, in ef-
fect, "the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the
creditor" factor can only mean, in an individual action, frequency
and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor with
respect to this plaintiff alone.97 The court does concede that some of
the listed factors apply equally to individual actions as well as to
class actions, to wit, the amount of actual damages awarded, the
creditor's resources, and the extent to which the noncompliance was
intentional; but the court refused any consideration of the bank's
policies and procedures, other than those regarding plaintiff's ap-
plication, before or after the denial of credit, on the premise that only
those procedures-not whatever the bank had done concerning
other applicants-would be probative on the issue of the bank's in-
tent regarding its failure of compliance in plaintiff's case.
The Vander Missen case does serve the worthy purpose of im-
posing tight reins on the award of punitive damages in an individual
action under the ECOA; but of course, the decision may also en-
hance the attractiveness of class actions. Moreover, the "intent"
analysis of the case seems reasonable. But to limit the "frequency
and persistence" factor to failures of compliance with respect to the
individual applicant alone is an esoteric construction, not at all in
line with a traditionally liberal construction of a remedial statute or
with traditional notions of punitive damages.
The ECOA enables the agencies having responsibility for admin-
istrative enforcement of the Act98 to refer a compliance problem to
the Attorney General, who may then bring a civil action against one
or more creditors "for such relief as may be appropriate, including
injunctive relief."" In addition to the injunction, the Attorney
General may, for example, seek relief in the form of a requirement
that the creditor reconsider previously denied credit applications,
utilizing reformed policies that comply with the law.' ° It may be
97. 481 F. Supp. at 748.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c (1976).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (g) & (h) (1976).
100. United States v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 80-1071 (D. D.C. 1980).
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argued that the Attorney General has implicit authority under the
ECOA to seek actual or even punitive damages, as an ancillary as-
pect of his authority to enforce the act."' The question was resolved
against the Attorney General in United States v. Beneficial Corp.,"0 2
thus limiting the Attorney General to noncompensatory, equitable
relief.
Debt Collection Practices
Wrongful seizure by a creditor can constitute an unfair act or
practice under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law, 3 but recovery for a violation of that act would
hinge upon proof of actual damages. If actual damages are awarded,
the award must be accompanied by one of attorney's fees and
costs.' 4 Wrongful seizure is also a tortious act, compensable as
such. ' A debtor subjected to wrongful seizure of his property can
recover not only special damages, but also general damages for
humiliation or mental distress,' as well as nominal damages. 7 A
prevailing party is, of course, not generally entitled to an award of
attorney's fees unless provided under statutory authority or con-
tractual stipulation.' No statutory authority exists in Louisiana for
an award of attorney's fees in instances of wrongful seizures under
executory process,' 9 but such awards have been made for several
years on the premise that attorney's fees are a recoverable item of
damages where the plaintiff is forced to enjoin or dissolve the
wrongful seizure under executory process in order to release his
property."0
101. Cf. State v. General Motors Corp., 370 So. 2d 477 (La. 1979) (class action by
state's attorney general for restitution under a deceptive practices statute).
102. 492 F. Supp. 682 (D.N.J. 1980).
103. LA. R.S. 51:1401-18 (Supp. 1972). See Moore v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
364 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), discussed in 1978-1979 Term, supra note 3, at
625-27.
104. LA. R.S. 51:1409(A) (Supp. 1972). The treble damages portion of section
1409(A) would not likely be applicable to the case of wrongful seizure, unless the
creditor's policy is routinely to repossess in disregard of the legal process.
105. See, e.g., Grandeson v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 223 La. 504, 66
So. 2d 317 (1953); Hitt v. Herndon, 166 La. 497, 117 So. 568 (1928); Levy v. Andress-
Hanna, Inc., 96 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957).
106. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nolan, 385 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1980); Dawson v. Piazza, 371 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Escat v. National Bank
of Commerce in New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 832 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
107. Samaniego v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 350 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977);
Edwards v. Butler, 203 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
108. Hernandez v. Harson, 237 La. 389, 111 So. 2d 320 (1958).
109. See Escat v. National Bank of Commerce in New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 832 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1973).
110. See, e.g., Escat v. National Bank of Commerce in New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 832
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Cox v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Gunn v.
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Until quite recently, the wrongful seizure/injunction exception to
the "no attorney's fees" general rule had been germinating only in
the fourth and second circuits; however, a series of decisions from
the first and third circuits within the last forty months appears to
have made the exception uniform in Louisiana. Those decisions are
May Company, Inc. v. Heirs of Sumage,'" Mid-State Homes, Inc. v.
Bice,"' General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Meyers,"3 Mid-State
Homes, Inc. v. Lartigue,'" and Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nolan."5
The Meyers opinion presents a nice recounting of the evolution of
the exception.
The lawyer may now reasonably wonder whether the exception
applies to a non-injunctive action for tortious conversion premised
on wrongful seizure, and indeed, whether the exception will
ultimately swallow up the rule. The answer to the first query may
be a negative one, and the theoretical basis of that negative answer
may presage a negative answer to the second query as well. The
second circuit, in which the exception is firmly entrenched, denied
attorney's fees in a 1976 case in which the plaintiff sought, not in-
junctive relief and return of the property wrongfully seized by the
creditor, but damages for the tortious conversion of the thing. The
court ruled, in Lee v. Lewis,"' that the case was not sufficiently
analogous to the circumstances of the cases awarding attorney's fees
in wrongful seizure/injunction actions to warrant application of the
exception."' The Lee decision did not cite the 1950 decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Smith v. Atkins,"8 which reached a
similar result where recovery of damages was sought for the wrong-
ful seizure of a building erected on a lot ultimately sold by defend-
ant to another. The supreme court there stated that, when the at-
torney's fees are not incurred for the obtaining of the release of the
property or dissolution of the writ, an award of attorney's fees can-
not be made." 9 The opinion suggests, in fact, that the award cannot
be made unless the attorney's fees are incurred exclusively for the
dissolution of the writ and/or release of the property.2 '
Credit Serv. Corp., 46 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950). See also Smith v. Atkins, 218
La. 1, 48 So. 2d 101 (1950).
111. 347 So. 2d 916 (La. App, 3d Cir. 1977).
112. 361 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
113. 377 So. 2d 1355 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
114. 383 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
115. 385 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
116. 339 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
117. The opinion cites only Cox v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
118. 218 La. 1, 48 So. 2d 101 (1950).
119. 218 La. at 7, 48 So. 2d at 103.
120. Id
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To draw a distinction between actions to obtain the return of a
wrongfully seized thing and those that seek compensation for tort-
ious loss of the thing risks Professor Dainow's appellation: "tweedle-
dum or tweedle-dee. '121 Since the supreme court, in applying the ex-
ception in injunction actions, has classified attorney's fees as
"damages," '122 perhaps it is time for the court to attempt to draw
that distinction between injunctive and other actions, within the
confines of Civil Code article 1934(2).123
Louisiana has long been a leading jurisdiction in recognizing the
right of a debtor in default to be free of unreasonable acts of the
creditor in his debt collection activities.'24 In at least three cases a
debtor has recovered damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress or invasion of privacy upon a finding that the creditor's act
of contacting the debtor's employer concerning a prejudgment debt
was unreasonably coercive. '25 In all three cases, however, the recov-
ery was premised on a finding that the creditor made the contact
with the intention of enlisting the employer's influence and control
over the debtor as a means of coercing the debtor to pay, through
fear of discharge or other adverse effect on his employment. Where
that intent is not demonstrated, contacts by creditors of the debtor's
employer are typically not actionable. 2 '
Actions in favor of the debtor can likewise arise when a creditor
121. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term
-Prescription, 25 LA. L. REV. 352, 356 (1965).
122. See Smith v. Atkins, 218 La. 1, 7, 48 So. 2d 101, 103 (1950); Marine Bank &
Trust Co. v. Shaffer, 166 La. 164, 116 So. 838 (1928); Ludeling v. Garrett, 50 La. Ann.
118, 23 So. 94 (1898); White v. Givens, 29 La. Ann. 571 (1877).
123. In White v. Givens, 29 La. Ann. 571, 572 (1877), the court said, in a wrongful
seizure/injunction case:
It is proper in estimating the damages occasioned by an unlawful invasion of the
rights of a plaintiff to prove the loss, including the expense which he has incurred
in preventing further wrong; and the reasonable fees of an attorney may be allow-
ed as well as any other expense occasioned to the plaintiff by the unlawful act of
the defendant.
See also Gilkerson-Sloss Comm'n Co. v. Yale & Bowling, 47 La. Ann. 690, 17 So. 244
(1895); Gilkerson-Sloss Comm'n Co. v. A. Baldwin & Co., Ltd., 47 La. Ann. 696, 17 So.
246 (1895).
124. See generally Louisiana's New Consumer Protection Legislation, 34 LA. L.
REV. 597, 625-28 (1974).
125. Booty v. American Fin. Corp. of Shreveport, 224 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1969); Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d
558 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944).
126. See Passman v. Commercial Credit Plan of Hammond, Inc., 220 So. 2d 758 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1969); Columbia Fin. Corp. v. Robitcheck, 142 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1962).
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contacts the debtor himself,'27 his spouse,'28 his neighbors,'29 or other
third parties' 0 having no legally recognized interest or right in the
debtor's personal problems. The latest in the line of creditor contact
cases, Ford Motor Credit Company v. Diffey, 3' found the acts of the
creditor, in periodically telephoning and personally contacting the
debtor at her place of employment, not unreasonably coercive. Im-
portant to the decision in Diffey was the choice by the creditor's
agent of a reasonable time of day for the visits, and the fact that the
plaintiff's co-employees were not made aware of the purpose of the
agent's visit, nor was her employment jeopardized.
The tort action is not the only protection Louisiana affords to
the debtor in default. Section 3562 of the Louisiana Consumer Credit
Law 132 prohibits contacts by any creditor' 33 regarding the debt to
any person not living, residing, or present in the household of the
debtor,'34 unless the debtor (subsequent to the date the debt arises)
consents thereto, or unless the purpose of the contact is to ascertain
information as to the debtor's creditworthiness, 5 his whereabouts,' 6
or his seizable property, or to make amicable demand and file suit
on the debt. Nothing in the prohibitory provisions of section 3562
would change the outcome of the Diffey case; however, a debtor has
the right under section 3562 to give the creditor a specific written
notice by registered or certified mail instructing him to cease fur-
ther contacts with the debtor concerning the indebtedness. Once the
notice is given, the creditor is limited to one non-threatening, mailed
notice per month, and a maximum of four personal contacts having
the purpose of settlement of the obligation.
127. Boudreaux v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 217 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
128. See Everett v. Community Credit Co. of Scenic, Inc., 224 So. 2d 145 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1969); Davis v. Lindsay Furn. Co., 138 So. 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931).
129. Boudreaux v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 217 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
130. Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919). See Cunningham v.
Securities Inv. Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1960).
131. 378 So. 2d 1032 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
132. LA. R.S. 9:3562 (Supp. 1972 & 1974).
133. The protection of section 3562 is expressly not limited to a creditor in a "con-
sumer credit transaction."
134. Exempted from the prohibition are contacts to other extenders of credit and
to credit reporting agencies. LA. R.S. 9:3562 (Supp. 1972 & 1974).
135. Section 3562, in effect, limits the "creditworthiness" contact to a situation in
which there is a debt allegedly owed, but the creditor nevertheless is contemplating
another extension of credit to the debtor. That situation seems somewhat unlikely. A
creditor to whom no debt is already owed by the debtor is not constrained in the first
instance by the opening paragraph of section 3562, so he has no need for the "credit-
worthiness" exception.
136. The "whereabouts" contact is permitted only when the creditor has reason to
believe that the debtor has changed his employment or last known address. LA. R.S.
9:3562(2)(b) (Supp. 1972 & 1974).
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Had Mrs. Diffey employed the "cease and desist" notice of sec-
tion 3562, one "dunning" telephone call to her from the defendant, at
any location, would have violated the prohibition of the credit law;' 7
but the enforcement provisions of the credit law do not squarely ap-
ply to such a violation' 8 so as to provide a civil remedy. It has been
suggested, however, that by analogy to the statutory negligence
area, a violation of section 3562 constitutes fault under Civil Code
article 2315."'
In the event that the creditor's agent happened to fall within
the definition of a "debt collector," the Diffey case would also be
qualified by the recently-enacted Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.14 0 Under that enactment a debt collector may not communicate
with a consumer-debtor at any unusual time or place, or at a time or
place he should know is inconvenient to the consumer-debtor"' (with
the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. being assumed to be the appropri-
ate hours of convenience, in the absence of the debt collector's con-
trary knowledge), nor may the debt collector communicate with the
consumer-debtor at the consumer's place of employment, if he knows
or has reason to know that the employer prohibits the consumer
from receiving such communication.'' The new act contains various
other prohibitions against debt collectors,"' for violation of which
the act provides a private action for damages.'"
A debt collector was recently introduced to the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act in Rutyna v. Collection Accounts Terminal,
Inc.,"' a federal district court case from Illinois which graphically il-
lustrates the potential for consumer protection that the new act pro-
vides. Mrs. Rutyna, a sixty-year-old widow, had incurred an in-
debtedness for medical services assumed by her to have been paid
in full by a combination of medicare and private medical insurance.
137. Section 3562(4) would permit such a contact in two limited situations.
138. See LA. R.S. 9:3552A (Supp. 1972).
139. See Louisiana's New Consumer Protection Legislation, 34 LA. L. REV. 597,
627-28 (1974).
140. 14 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-92o (1977). Section 1692a(6) defines debt collector as a per-
son whose principal business purpose is the collection of debts, or who regularly does
collect debts asserted to be owed or due another. Use of an instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce is, of course, a prerequisite to the applicability of the act. A
creditor attempting collection of his own accounts would not be a "debt collector"
unless he uses a name other than his own in the collection effort, if such an alias would
indicate that a third party is attempting collection.
141. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c(a)(1) (1977).
142. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c(a)(3) (1977).
143. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692d-92j (1977).
144. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k (1977).
145. 478 F. Supp. 980 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
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The debt collector sent her a letter ' stating, in reference to a por-
tion of the indebtedness allegedly not paid:
You have shown that you are unwilling to work out a friendly
settlement with us to clear the above debt.
Our field investigator has now been instructed to make an in-
vestigation in your neighborhood and to personally call on your
employer.
The immediate payment of the full amount, or a personal visit to
this office, will spare you this embarrassment.
The envelope containing the letter bore the full name of the debt
collection company.
The debt collector's letter in Rutyna violated the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act in at least three regards. First, the "natural
consequence" of the letter was to "harrass, oppress, or abuse" Mrs.
Rutyna, in violation of section 1692d of the act,"7 in that the tone of
the letter was one of intimidation, intended as such. Second, the
defendant's threat to contact Mrs. Rutyna's neighbors and employer
constituted a false representation or threat as to the actions that
defendant could legally take 48 because the act itself would prohibit
(with certain irrelevant exceptions) any communication by the de-
fendant to her neighbors or her employer."' Third, the return ad-
146. It was disputed whether prior telephonic contact between the parties had oc-
curred. Id. at 981.
147. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692d (1977). The section lists (nonexclusively) six specifically
prohibited types of conduct, ,but the section is intended to prohibit any harrassing, un-
fair, or deceptive collection practice.
148. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e(5) (1977).
149. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c(b) (1977). In Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 594 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1979), a collector's letter advising the debtor that a
failure to answer would result in an immediate lawsuit violated the act because, in
fact, the collector was shown to have never filed a suit until several other steps had
been tried, and such a suit could not, in any event, be said to be imminent. Cf. State v.
O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980) (threat to take legal action
violated state deceptive practices law).
Whether the Trans World letter would constitute a tortious threat is an issue that
apparently has not arisen in Louisiana. The Supreme Court of Louisiana did hold in
1902 that it is not duress, within the meaning of Civil Code articles 1850 through 1859,
for a creditor to threaten a civil suit or "to declare [that] he intends to use the courts
wherein to insist upon what he believes to be his legal rights." New Orleans & N.E.R.
Co. v. Louisiana Constr. & Imp. Co., 109 La. 13, 23, 33 So. 51, 55 (1902). The 1902 deci-
sion, which cited for authority Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233, 27 N.E. 1010
(1891). Snyder v. Braden, 58 Ind. 143 (1877), Buck v. Axt, 58 Ind. 512 (1882), and Civil
Code article 1856, was reaffirmed in Storey v. Stanton, 182 La. 873, 162 So. 649 (1935),
a consent case under articles 1850 through 1859. Of course, the Civil Code does
declare, in the context of consent, that if the threats are only of doing that which the
threatening party has a right to do, the consent of the other is not so impaired as to
invalidate the contract. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1856. But important to the 1902 decision of
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dress on the defendant's envelope violated section 1692f(8) in that it
revealed to the world that the letter it enclosed was from a debt col-
lection business.
The defendant in Rutyna sought to defend the return address
violation on the basis that, due to its lack of awareness of the pro-
hibition of section 1692f(8), the violation was "unintentional and
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid" such an error.1"' But the
act does not immunize mistakes of law;15' it forgives the collector
where he intended to prevent the conduct that violated the act, but
failed despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid the error.
Both the federal and the Louisiana law permit communications
by a creditor or debt collector to a third person for the purpose of
determining the debtor's whereabouts, but there are qualifications
on the exception in both cases. The "whereabouts" exception in
Louisiana is so written as to implicitly require good faith,' 2 while
the federal provision is quite specific in its "location information"
the Supreme Court of Louisiana was the notion that a threat to sue, after all, does
give the threatened party a chance to have his day in court should he desire to contest
the legality of the demand. 109 La. at 23-24, 33 So. at 55. Perhaps it is implicit in the
debt collection context that no litigable defense to payment exists; but still, it would
have to be said that the threatening collector typically has no intention of filing suit,
and the debtor will not, therefore, have a chance to contest matters.
In Patorno v. Vacaro, 153 La. 364, 95 So. 864 (1923), the court conceded-again in a
consent context-that Civil Code article 1857 must qualify any broad statements con-
cerning the invalidation of consent by threats. Under article 1857, a threat of arrest,
for example, made without any cause for arrest and for the purpose of obtaining con-
sent results in an invalid contract. Though the Trans World case does not fall within
article 1857, or within the Patorno case, it is clear that there is nothing in Patorno,
New Orleans & N.E.R. Co., or Storey that would present a defense to the allegation of
tort in a Trans World case. Against this background, the decision in Campbell v.
Parker, 209 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), becomes clarified. In Campbell a debt
collector allegedly threatened to file a civil suit against the debtor; of this alleged
threat the court said, citing to Storey v. Stanton, that "such action is not unlawful,
since [the debt collector] was informing [the debtor] of his legal rights. That alone, is
insufficient to constitute a tort." Id. at 339. If, in fact, the creditor or debt collector
does not coincidentally intend to fulfill his threat, nothing in articles 1850 through 1859
or in the Louisiana jurisprudence is at odds with the notion that such a threat would
be tortious in Louisiana.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (1977).
151. The Truth in Lending act is likewise unforgiving in the mistake of law situa-
tion, the Supreme Court in Louisiana's pronouncement to the contrary in Thrift Funds
of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Jones, 274 So. 2d 150 (La. 1973), notwithstanding. See Haynes
v. Logan Furn. Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974); 1972-1973 Term, supra note
24, at 326-30.
152. LA. R.S. 9:3562(2)(b) (Supp. 1972 & 1974).
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exception. 53 The collection tactics disclosed by Ford Motor Credit
Company v. Sheehan15 ' would be violative of Louisiana and federal
law. Ford Motor Credit Company was unable to locate Sheehan to
remind him of an unpaid debt, but the company did know how to
reach Mr. Sheehan's mother. An employee of FMCC telephoned
Mother Sheehan, falsely identified herself as an employee of a hos-
pital in San Francisco, falsely advised the mother that her son's
children had been involved in a serious automobile accident, and
falsely advised her that the hospital desired to contact Mr. Sheehan.
Naturally, the information as to Mr. Sheehan's whereabouts was
quickly obtained. Unfortunately, with the charade successfully pulled
off, the FMCC employee did not confess the same to Mother Shee-
han, and after her telephone call to Mr. Sheehan, the latter spent a
fruitless, and no doubt frantic, seven hours making long distance
calls to hospitals and police departments in San Francisco. The
Florida court had no trouble affirming an award to Mr. Sheehan of
$4,000 compensatory and $11,000 punitive damages, based on a com-
mon law intentional infliction of emotional distress theory. The
Sheehan result undoubtedly would be obtained in such a case in
Louisiana, although section 3562 of the Credit Law appears to be of
little aid.'55 Had Ford Motor Credit Company been a debt collector,5 '
several provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act would
have been violated. 7
One of the underlying justifications for the Louisiana and
federal laws is the likelihood of coercion when a small debt is involved.
Creditors and debt collectors have legal recourse; if they choose not
to utilize it for reasons of economics, that is their choice. But an
economically non-viable claim must be "written off"; it cannot be the
justification for continuous coercion. In short, the laws now provide
a choice for creditors and debt collectors: sue the small account
debtor in default, or forget him.' The potential for loss of employ-
153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b, 1692a(7) (1977).
154. 373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. App. 1979).
155. But see LA. R.S. 9:3562(5) (Supp. 1972 & 1974); Boudreaux v. Allstate Fin.
Corp., 217 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
156. Most legitimate financial institutions fall without the section 1692a(6) defini-
tion of debt collector; as an assignee of the dealer, Ford Motor Credit Company is col-
lecting a debt (originally) owed by another, but as an assignee thereof, falls within the
exclusion language of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(G)(iii) or (iv).
157. Ford Motor Credit Company had the ability under the act to contact third par-
ties in an effort to locate Mr. Sheehan, but it did not follow the commandments of sec-
tions 1692b(1) and 1692c(b); the company also violated the provisions of section
1692e(10)(11) and (14).
158. The presumption attendant to contracting is that the obligation will be judi-
cially enforced. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1799, 1803. It should be noted that creditors them-
selves understand that the major reasons for default are unemployment and illness,
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ment also justifies protection of the debtor in default. As a part of
the protection of consumer debtors, the Consumer Credit Protection
Act prohibits the discharge of an employee whose earnings have
been subjected to garnishment for but one indebtedness.159 The act
provides for a fine for violators, but does not expressly provide for a
private action by the wrongfully discharged consumer. In 1974 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such an action was implicitly
authorized by Congress;"' the fifth circuit has now taken the con-
trary view, in Smith v. Cotton Brothers Baking Company, Inc.'
QUALITY EXPECTATIONS
The Consumer Product Warranties (Magnuson-Moss) Act
As a nationalized uniform law of consumer product warranties
and of warranty disclaimer, the Magnuson-Moss Act"2 represents an
alternative or additive to the redhibition action for the Louisiana
consumer purchaser. But the federal act adds very little to the pro-
tection currently provided by the Civil Code; 3 in fact, the federal
law enhances the redhibition action by neutering all attempts by af-
fected suppliers to waive redhibition.' 4 Aside from federal court
jurisdiction,' the Louisiana consumer might find the possibility of
an attorney's fee award (based on actual time expended)' an induce-
ment for a Magnuson-Moss action. But as seen in Watts v. Volks-
wagen Artiengesellschaft'67 the possibility of class action status is
not an inducement to the plaintiff unless there are one hundred
named plaintiffs at the time federal jurisdiction is invoked.' 8
while lack of intention to pay ("deadbeat") ranks relatively low on the list of reasons
for default. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE AND CONSUMER
CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (1972).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1976).
160. Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974).
161. 609 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1980).
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1976). See Miller & Kanter, Litigation Under Magnuson-
Moss: New Opportunities in Private Actions, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 10 (1980).
163. See 1978-1979 Term, supra note 3, at 619-23.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1976). A supplier is a person engaged in the business of mak-
ing a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers. 15 U.S.C. §
2301(4) (1976). If the supplier makes a written warranty, or enters into a service con-
tract with the consumer, he is affected by section 2308. In truth, even this provision
adds little to the protection in Louisiana. See Thibodeaux v. Meaux's Auto Sales, Inc.,
364 So. 2d 1370 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1976).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1976).
167. 488 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Ark. 1980).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(C) (1976). See also Barr v. General Motors Corp., 80
F.R.D. 136 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
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Redhibition
By virtue of its tenure and relative immutability, the Civil Code
typically affords the lawyer the great advantage of a wealth of juris-
prudence to aid his analysis of the Code's meaning. Until very
recently, however, this was not so in the case of the reimbursement
of expenses in the rescission of a home sale transaction, perhaps
because buyers of a defective home historically have opted more
often for a reduction in price under articles 2541-44 than for redhibi-
tion under articles 2520 and 2531.69 The Supreme Court of Louisiana
has now provided, in Abdelbaki v. University Presbyterian
Church,17 clarification of the recoverable expenses in a home sale
rescission case. The court held recoverable, as "expenses
occasioned" by the sale, loan closing costs, loan appraisal costs,
homestead charges such as interest, real estate taxes and insurance
premiums, expenses incident to release of mortgage including penal-
ties incurred, all costs of reconveyance of the property, and finance
charges.17
CONTRACTS FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF CONSUMER SERVICES
Damages for Nonperformance
The home purchaser is not typically motivated primarily by the
possibility of a profit upon ultimate resale. Hence, even in the
relatively rare case of a bad faith seller, 7 the home purchaser is not
likely to have suffered the kind of loss or damage readily measur-
169. The elements utilized by the judge in a reduction of the price case are explain-
ed by Judge (now Justice) Lemmon in Menville v. Stephens Chevrolet, Inc., 300 So. 2d
858 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
170. 380 So. 2d 35 (La. 1980).
171. The court had previously placed finance charges within the "expenses occa-
sioned" category in Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 359 So. 2d 607 (La. 1978), and
Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., Inc., 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973).
Among the other items of "expenses occasioned" on which the home buyer may ex-
pect reimbursement are long-distance calls to the seller regarding the sale; transporta-
tion expenses to view the home and/or conclude the sale, see Greenburg v. Fourroux,
300 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); filing, recording or other "official" fees, see
First Nat'l Bank of Ruston v. Miller, 329 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); moving ex-
penses, see Bernofsky v. Schwartz, 370 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); preparation
and landscaping, see Rapides Grocery Co., Inc. v. Clopton, 125 So. 325 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1929); repairs not for "preservation of the thing," see Huffman-Euro Motors, Inc.
v. Physical Therapy Serv., Ltd., 373 So. 2d 565 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); and prepaid ex-
penses, such as for pest control or home security services, see Bernofsky v. Schwartz,
370 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
172. See Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); Sallinger v.
Mayer, 304 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Ford v. Broussard, 248 So. 2d 629 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1971); Gabriel v. Jeansonne, 162 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964);
DiPietro v. LeBlanc, 68 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
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able in pecuniary terms as required under article 1934. The same
may be said for the owner who has contracted with a nonperforming
contractor for home construction or home repair. Article 1934, in the
third enumerated paragraph, seems to have contemplated that not
all who contract will be able to show pecuniary damages, yet in
some instances ought to be awarded damages nonetheless. Prior to
the November, 1979, Supreme Court of Louisiana decision in
Ostrowe v. Darensbourg,"' Louisiana courts had seemed willing to
bring within article 1934(3) consumer transactions that were impor-
tant14 and, in some instances, obviously unforeseeable from the van-
tage point of the year 1825. The Ostrowe decision holds that
damages for mental anguish are not recoverable for the breach of a
contract to build a home, even a "distinctively designed" and "ex-
clusive" one, since the principal object of such a contract is simply to
provide shelter from the elements, rather than the gratification of
some intellectual enjoyment. Thus, under the court's narrow view of
article 1934(3) the "gratification of some intellectual enjoyment"
must be the principal object of the contract, rather than a principal
object thereof, as was arguably suggested in the court's prior deci-
sion in Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc.'75 If the court is unwill-
ing, or unable, to distinguish a simple one-room cinder-block abode
from a distinctively planned and unique home in an exclusive
residential area, it appears that article 1934(3) has virtually no
meaning for the Louisiana consumer.'6
Enforcement of Consumer Contracts
The common law and the civil law of Louisiarfa share at least
one heritage-one set of rules for the formation of contracts, with
the implicit premise that all obligations are contracted at arm's
length through a process of actual term-by-term bargaining by par-
173. 377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1979).
174. See Whitener v. Clark, 356 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 So.
2d 638, 641 (La. 1978); Wolfe v. LeVasseur-Hinson Constr. Co., 147 So. 2d 747 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1962); Jack v. Henry, 128 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); Melson v.
Woodruff, 23 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
175. 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
176. Presumably unaffected by the Ostrowe decision are: Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La.
1030, 34 So. 66 (1903), Graham v. Western Union TeL Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91
(1903), O'Meallie v. Moreau, 116 La. 1020, 41 So. 243 (1906), Jiles v. Venus Community
Center Benev. Mut. Aid Assn, 191 La. 803, 186 So. 342 (1939), and Grather v. Tipery
Studios, Inc., 334 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). In the recent decision in Gele v.
Markey, 387 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1980), there appears a hint that Meador and Ostrowe
may not be the final chapter in the mental damages sage: "[T]he application of . . .
Meador... to this case seems to work an injustice [and] the court of appeal did not ap-
pear to have consideration whether the record would support an award of emotional
distress damages as the result of a delict or quasi-delict." 387 So. 2d at 1163.
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ties having relatively equal bargaining power. The need for mass
contracting, brought about by mass production and mass marketing,
surely undercut whatever validity that implicit premise historically
may have enjoyed. The "similarity" between the two systems is
superficial, for at the foundation of the common law is the notion of
caveat emptor-an idea foreign to the Louisiana Civil Code.'
Because of the tradition of caveat emptor, the common law states
did not always adjust easily to changes in the manner in which con-
tracts were formed with standard form contracts. The Civil Code, on
the other hand, has been applied in Louisiana under a dual standard,
recognized as such by the Supreme Court of Louisiana,' whereby
the formation and enforceability of a contract may depend, to a
large degree, on the level of sophistication of the buyer, landowner,
lessee, or borrower. The court has recently reaffirmed that position
in Louisiana Leasing Corp. v. ADF Service, Inc., stating that:
Safeguards protecting consumers must be more stringent than
those protecting businessmen competing in the marketplace. It
must be presumed that persons engaged in business . . . were
aware of the contents of the lease agreement which they
signed."9
The commercially sophisticated lessee, therefore, could not claim
that the contract clause waiving the lessor's implied warranty of
fitness of the leased thing had not been brought to its attention, i.e.,
consumer-protective decisions such as Prince v. Paretti Pontiac
Company, Inc.,8 ' do not fully apply in non-consumer cases. 8' The
lessor in Southern States Equipment Company v. Jack Legett Com-
pany"'82 similarly enforced a rather harsh clause imposing on the com-
mercially sophisticated lessee unrestricted liability for loss or
damage to the leased thing.
That successful reliance on self-serving contract terms is con-
siderably less likely in cases involving a consumer is demonstrated
177. See Rushton v. LaCaze, 106 So. 2d 729 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958); Dependable
Refrig., Inc. v. Giambelluca, 94 So. 2d 148 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957).
178. In Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 So. 2d
377 (La. 1972), the court stated that "Louisiana has aligned itself with the consumer-
protection rule, by allowing a consumer without privity to recover . - ." Id. at 381.
The idea was applied in Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1973), in which the fourth circuit conceded that, because there is a greater presump-
tion that a commercially sophisticated buyer is more aware of the contents of a writ-
ten agreement than is the typical consumer, id. at 791, the rules as to renunciation or
waiver of redhibition do not apply equally to those two classes of buyer.
179. 377 So. 2d 92, 96 (La. 1979) (citation omitted).
180. 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973).
181. See 1978-1979 Term, supra note 3, at 619-23.
182. 379 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
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by Bowes v. Fox-Stanley Photo Products, Inc.,'83 in which a photo
processor's attempted disclaimer of warranty in the form of a limit
on liability for loss of the customer's film or photographs, was held
ineffective against a consumer. The Bowes decision applies the same
legal principle as was applied in ADF and Legett, i.e., whether the
clause was explained or brought to the attention of the affected par-
ty; but the result obtained is quite different. One would conclude,
then, that a given waiver or excuplation clause held not binding
against a commercially sophisticated lessee, or services contractant,
will certainly be of no effect as against a consumer. One accordingly
must doubt the efficacy of the ubiquitous "we are not responsible
for loss or theft."'
84
183. 379 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
184. See Wilda, Inc. v. Devall Diesel, Inc., 343 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977)
("not responsible for downtime" clause on an invoice not binding on corporation con-
tracting for repair services on marine engine). Cf. Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc. v.
Neidhardt, 381 So. 2d 979 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (discussing the liability of an
automobile interior cleaning services contractor-a compensated depositary).
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